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North Korea’s Kim Jong-un has stated publicly that the country is facing a food shortage, a rare
admission for the country’s leader, who blamed the pandemic and a recent typhoon.
Last year, speaking at an anniversary event of the Workers’ Party of Korea, Kim urged his people to
“remain firm in the face of ‘tremendous challenges’ posed by the pandemic”. One such challenge Kim
has warned of is the potential for a famine echoing the “arduous march” of the late 1990s, when the
country faced a period of mass starvation that reportedly killed millions.
Kim’s response to COVID-19 has made North Korea even more isolated, leading to food shortages that
are likely to impact millions. His slimmer look may also indicate Kim’s own lack of access to the food
he used to have.
Is North Korea on its way toward another arduous march?
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Kim Jong-un’s COVID-19 border closures have caused a food shortage in North Korea, reminiscent of the “arduous march” of the 1990s. KCNA /
EPA-EFE
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A country isolated
North Korea was one of the first countries to respond to the COVID-19 outbreak by closing its borders
in January 2020. North Korea still claims zero positive COVID-19 cases, which no one can really
confirm.
There have been signs of a devastating economic situation in North Korea associated with the closed
border, which entirely blocked existing illegal trades. Due to existing sanctions, there were not many
legitimate trade activities in North Korea, apart from with China, but smuggling has sustained supply
and demand chains in general.
At the moment, North Korea is facing its toughest international sanctions yet, imposed in 2017 over
its sixth nuclear test. The first such sanctions were put in place by the UN in 2006 over North Korea’s
ballistic missile tests, and were expanded when the country conducted its first nuclear test that same
year.
It is believed that the COVID-19 border closure has affected the North Korean economy even more
than the sanctions, resulting in a more than 50% decrease in trade with China compared to 2018.
The border closure has resulted in a lack of access to agricultural materials such as fertiliser and
machinery, making it hard for North Koreans to have a sufficient grain harvest. Additionally, food
imports and humanitarian aid are not being allowed due to the lockdown.
Vaccination troubles
During the initial arduous march, North Korea received a massive amount of food aid from the
international community. It is a reasonable assumption that it is in need of more aid this time. But
despite calls from the international community to provide humanitarian aid to North Korea, Kim’s
regime has not allowed them into the country.
When Kim Jong-un became leader, he promised his people that they “would never have to tighten 
their belt again”. Now, he has decided to announce another arduous march rather than engage with
the international community, risking a hit to his credibility.
There seem to be two main reasons why North Korea is hesitant to reopen its borders while people
suffer from serious lack of food nationwide.
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Lack of access to agricultural supplies due to border closures is threatening harvests in North Korea. BJ Warnick / 
Newscom / Alamy stock photo
First, there is a huge risk of a COVID-19 outbreak with current measures. The country lacks capacity
to deal with the pandemic, so massive and effective vaccination will be the only solution for North
Korea to control the spread of the virus in the country. North Korea was initially approved to receive 
nearly 2 million doses of AstraZeneca vaccines from Covax, the global vaccination distribution
programme. However, this number has been reduced to 1.7 million which covers only about 3.3% of 
its entire population.
On top of this, delivery has been delayed as North Korea did not participate in the required
consultation process. The international community seems to be ready to provide more vaccines once
Kim agrees to cooperate on vaccine supply.
Jangmadang and cultural influx
The second reason why Kim is willing to risk his credibility over accepting international aid is his fear
of continuous information influx.
During the first arduous march, North Korean political leaders observed humanitarian workers
sharing external information with local people, which was then prohibited by authorities. However,
this was not a significant problem for leadership as ordinary North Koreans did not have access to the
outside world, and were effectively brainwashed by state propaganda.
This time, North Koreans have more access than ever to the outside world. They have wider use of
mobile phones, and USBs and SD cards containing K-Pop and South Korean films and dramas have
been smuggled into the daily life of North Koreans through jangmadang (grey markets – literally,
“outdoor market” in Korean). Higher levels of information influx combined with less ideology
education has caused people to rethink their regime, and domestic discontent has developed as a
result.
Jangmadang became a core part of North Koreans’ survival system when the government was unable
to provide rations and necessities during the 1990s. For the jangmadang generation, daily life
survival was more important than regime survival. They could not attend school, and thus were not
subject to intense state ideology education. Jangmadang and younger generations now tend to place
more value on money and South Korean cultural influence than Jucheism – North Korean state
ideology – weakening their loyalty to the regime.
Fortunately for Kim, this phenomenon has slowed due to the current border closure. But once the
border is reopened, there will be a surge of information into the country again. Thus, Kim would want
to ensure the revival of strong state ideology before he reopens doors to the international community.
He has conducted strong punishments against those who possess and/or spread foreign media among
people, and emphasised the need for enhanced ideological education. In April, Kim sent a letter to the
Youth League aiming to “root out anti-socialist and non-socialist practices, and improve ideological
education”.
Kim’s isolation may have successfully blocked the spread of COVID-19 and external cultural influence
among the population, but it has also blocked the channels to basic necessity. Kim will need to reopen
the borders in order to avert the second arduous march, but it will be hard for him to find immediate
alternatives to mitigate the risks to his regime.
There are signs of gradual resumption of trade between North Korea and China, but it has been
limited. As Kim has announced that North Korea needs to prepare for “both dialogue and 
confrontation” with the US, the international community could take this as an opportunity to
approach North Korea again, but with more productive and practical solutions for its isolated people.
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